This paper investigates, empirically, the voters' choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.
I. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization plays a crucial role both in public finance theory and in the design and evaluation of fiscal policies. At the theoretical level, there is no agreement on the most important issues about fiscal decentralization or on the real * We would like to thank G. Porto, J. Remes Lenicov, E. Rezk and W. Sosa Escudero for their useful and wise comments. Very challenging and thought-provoking too were the comments from L. Feld at the 55 th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance in Moscow and from J. Streb at the XXXIV Anual Meeting of the Asociación Argentina de Economía Política in Rosario. We would also like to thank the comments of all the participants of the Department of Economics Seminars at the National University of La Plata. The usual disclaim applies.
functioning of the multilevel governments.
1 In this paper we empirically investigate "The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations" (Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America);
"The optimum form of government: a federal system" (W. E. Oates: Federalismo Fiscal);
"Decentralization can jeopardize stability," "Decentralization can undermine efficiency," "Decentralization can (...) be the mother of segregation," "corruption is more widespread at the local than at national level" (Remy Prud'homme: The Dangers of Decentralization);
"and it does seem enough to call for a revision in the conventional wisdom that stabilization should not be a state responsability" (E. M. Gramlich: Federalism and Federal Deficit Reduction) ; "Properly applied, the conventional theory of decentralization can help improve the enactment and execution of government policy," "It takes a great deal of production efficiency, which Prud'homme says is an advantage of centralization, to offset a central government choice to waste resources on activities that are harmful to the populace" (military, palaces or anything else of low priority to the populace) (Ch.E.Mc Lure Jr (Comment on Prud'homme)); "I find it quite appropriate that subnational governments should participate in redistribution, as they do in practice; (...) Some participation by subnational governments in stabilization policy is also sensible. Finally, the case for decentralization is fundamentally based on efficiency considerations." (D. O. Sewell (Comment on Prud'homme));
"on the assumption that people should get what they want -rather than someone else wants them to want (...) decentralization is in principle a plus, not a minus." "Nonetheless, decentralization is still a good idea" (Bird and Rodriguez: Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation).
"Federal decentralization, and in particular local autonomy, is another constitutional element which can be hypothesized to positively affect citizens` happiness. Political decision making in municipalities is closer to relevant information about residents` preferences and also closer to direct control by its citizens" (Frey and Stutzer: Happiness, Economy and Institutions).
there have been four municipal elections. This fact has raised the intriguing question of whether ballot box is an efficient mechanism to control fiscal variables.
In Section II we review three models of fiscal decentralization, namely "vote with their feet" as in Tiebout, concentration of the fiscal decision power as in political economy models, and the ballot box. Section III studies some conditions for the functioning of fiscal decentralization in practice. Section IV presents results about the relationship between election outcomes and fiscal performance for Argentina. Section V concludes.
The results of this paper, though preliminary, suggest that fiscal decentralization and ballot box plus mobility of goods and factors could make fiscal centralization less necessary than political economy models and several attempts of creating new fiscal institutions in Argentina have suggested.
II. Models of Fiscal Decentralization
One of the first developments in this field is Tiebout (1956) . This model arises as an answer to Samuelson (1954 Samuelson ( ,1955 who, in his extension of welfare theory to incorporate public goods, concludes that "the "solution" exists; the problem is how to find it." The "solution" requires that the summation of the marginal rates of substitution over all members of the community be equated to the marginal rate of transformation. A competitive market fails and the quantity of public goods provided is likely to be less than the Pareto-optimal quantity (Laffont, 1988; Mueller, 1989) . According to Tiebout, it is necessary to distinguish between national or federal public goods -for which Samuelson's result applies-and local public goods for which there is a mechanism that functions "like the market" and yields the same optimal solution that a private market would. The Tiebout consumervoter may be visualized as choosing among several communities with already set revenue and expenditure patterns and picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. Mobility -"vote with their feet"-is the mechanism that yields the provision of the optimal bundle of goods at the minimum cost. In Tiebout`s words (1956: 422) : "just as the consumer may be visualized as walking to a private market place to buy his goods, the prices of which are set, we place him in the position of walking to a community where the prices (taxes) of community services are set. Both trips take the consumer to market. There is no way in which the consumer can avoid revealing his preferences in a spatial economy.
Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to the private market's shopping trip". A practical implication of the analysis is that policies that promote mobility and increase the knowledge of the consumer-voter will improve the allocation of public expenditures. Tiebout (1956: 424) concludes that the "local government represents a sector where the allocation of public goods (as a reflection of the preferences of the population) need not take a back seat to the private sector."
Information, knowledge, interjurisdictional competition and mobility are the keys of the model.
In its over four decades of life, Tiebout's paper has generated a wealth of literature, both theoretical and empirical. 2 It could not have been different because it is a very short paper (only eight pages) without mathematics or figures, with strong assumptions and not well clarified issues. We would like to emphasize two points about the paper. The first is about Tiebout's mechanism for obtaining economic efficiency, that is, the mobility of the consumer-voter ("vote with their feet") and the later extension to goods and productive factors. 3 The second is that, in the presence of fiscal disparities among regions, fiscal decentralization should include a mechanism for transferring financial resources from wealthy to poor regions (Buchanan, 1950; Oates, 1972) . Similar to a world where only private goods exist, the solution arising from competition is efficient but not necessarily fair. "Thus, our analysis suggests that we should applaud interjurisdictional competition on efficiency grounds whenever the federal government has fulfilled the redistributive function" (Oates and Schwab, 1991: 128 ).
An alternative approach to Tiebout can be found in the literature focusing on the political and institutional determinants of fiscal results (Alesina et.al., 1995; Alesina y Perotti, 1996; Stein et.al., 1997; Velasco, 1997) . The essence of this approach can be freely outlined as follows: when there are several levels of government and revenue sharing systems, revenues become "common property"
at various levels. On this "common property" influence fiscal and political institutions leading to intergovernmental grants higher than optimal, excessive local public goods, inadequate local tax effort, fiscal deficits, excessive public debt, etc. All of these probably end in macroeconomic calamities (e.g. high inflation or hyperinflation). The implicit or explicit message of this approach seems to be that fiscal decentralization is the mother of all evils, that in a decentralized world the fight for "common property" is exacerbated and that the "solution" must be in the hands of a central planner. The greater the power of this central planner, the better the fiscal results obtained. If in this context decentralization is required it must be simply understood as "deconcentration" or "delegation" (Bird, 1995 (Bird, 1995) . The recent literature puts another plus for fiscal federalism and ballot-box:
the positive impact on citizens' happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 1999) .
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III. Fiscal Decentralization in Practice
Two important questions for the analysis of fiscal decentralization are:
A) Which are the conditions for the efficient working of fiscal decentralization?
B) If we trust in democratic mechanisms (the ballot box and the political institutions of each country) for fiscal decision-making and control, which fiscal variables do consumers-voters take into consideration when they vote? Which fiscal variables should politicians attend to if they wish to win the following election?
A) Conditions for Efficient Working of Local Governments and Fiscal
Decentralization
As it is expressed in Oates (1994: 126) "the public sector in the real world, however, consists of a set of institutions -and spending and tax programs are enacted and function within this context." Tiebout (1956) also expresses this worry.
The question that arises is whether there is a set of social institutions, which could lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the public sector. In general, the conditions for the efficient functioning of local governments -fiscal decentralization-are (Bahl y Linn, 1994; Bird y Rodriguez, 1995) : 
B) The Relevant Fiscal Variables
An important issue is whether citizens "look at" variables of fiscal performance when they vote and, if they do, which variables they consider. Conversely, we need to discover if politicians take these variables into account. It is hard to find an absolute answer. Probably different societies, different levels of government, different moments or circumstances will influence the relevant variables for citizens and politicians. 7 In the Argentine case, as in the case of other countries, another condition that could be added is that "properties rights" over fiscal resources have to be clearly defined. This has to be done after an open discussion in the society about what the different levels of government are doing and what they have done with the money.
The analysis of the citizen-voters response to fiscal variables is based on a simple model following Peltzman (1987 Peltzman ( , 1990 Peltzman ( , 1992 Peltzman ( , 1998 and Besley and Case (1995) . Two comments are necessary. In the first place, it is supposed that voting is used to discipline the political party in office. Secondly, it is assumed that consumer-voters are able to evaluate the performance of the political party in office and that this evaluation is made using available information from the municipality where they live. Such assessment is made considering the impact of the activities of the municipal public sector on the utility (U). The change in utility due to the fiscal policy of the political party in office may be positive or negative and it depends on the change in municipal fiscal variables. This change and the evaluation is made by consumer-voters ex post, that is, the assessment is based on past performance. Voters take the change in utility into account to decide whether or not to re-elect the incumbent party. There is a function f (U), with f' < 0, that transforms the variation in utility in probability to change the political party in office. The transformation is made with a function
where V i is the probability to change the political party in office in the municipality i; A i is a constant indicating the "normal" probability of change explained by other variables (e.g. that citizens prefer rotation in the office per se, etc.); U i is function of the change in municipal fiscal variables (X i ); P i is the population in i; Y i is the change in income per capita in i. shows considerable learning within a relatively short interval.
For the re-election of governors in the USA, the most important variable seems to be the level of compared taxation. Besley and Case (1995) have shown that voters choose whether to re-elect governors based "on their performance while in office." For this purpose, citizens compare such performance with that of neighbours ("yardstick competition"). Moreover, if some policies lead to electoral success, one could hypothesize that such policies would spread, with the consequence that the "voters' choice and incumbent behaviour are determined simultaneously." The importance of this study lies in the fact that, regardless of the fiscal variable considered, there is a relationship between fiscal performance (in this study, relative) and electoral result. Democracy "matters" and affects the decisions of politicians.
Politicians, knowing how citizens behave, are encouraged to adopt the fiscal measures that citizens deem appropriate. The democratic mechanism, together with the mobility of goods, factors, and people, may lead to good fiscal results without the need to resort to centralized solutions. In Besley and Case's model, the functioning is as follows: if one governor increases taxes and neighbouring governors do not, there is a strong likelihood that citizens will vote against him in the following election, in which case he will not be re-elected. The governor is knowledgeable of how citizens vote and checks that his tax level is not significantly different from that of his neighbours. For Argentina, Gasparini (1997) also finds evidence of municipal interrelationships in tax policy. It could be objected that this mechanism may result in the sub-production of local public goods and a mix far from optimum. The answer resides in the fact that the same competition exists for expenditures (Case, Hines and Rosen, 1993; Porto, 1995) , what will act as a balancing mechanism. The important conclusion is that, considering both taxes and expenditures, citizens vote in the ballot box and politicians consider their opinions in implementing policies.
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In an analysis of the principles of local taxing, Spahn (1995: 222-23 ) also emphasizes the interaction between voters and politicians. "Local politicians should be responsive to the expressed preferences of their local citizens or expect to encounter defeat in local elections. This is the basic principle of accountability of local policymakers, and it is essential both for economic efficiency and democratic representation." A central issue for the good functioning of the political system is the information made available for the community. "Information policies are crucial for a decentralized government. Information is necessary to make co-ordination effective, and inform the national governments and its voters (...). It is also important to estimulate competence between jurisdictions and thus encourage innovations" Spahn (1997: 227-228) .
IV. Voters'Choices as Control of Fiscal Variables
The Argentine experience since the return to democracy in 1983 offers some interesting results. The 125 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires and the four elections at this level (1983, 1987, 1991, 1995) (Tables 1 to 3) . Considering the three elections, the highest percentage of changes in the political affiliation of officials in municipalities (46 %) was recorded in the less populated areas. Conversely, the lowest percentage (19 %) corresponded to more populated districts. This suggests that the smaller the size of the population, the higher the probability of changes in the political color of authorities. This result can be explained by recourse to the argument that in a small community citizens are more sensitive to the performance of officials in government and that individual votes have strong power (Table 4) . To answer the third question, three fiscal variables were selected for the analysis of the relationship between results in elections and fiscal performance: first, the porcentual change in the per capita provincial grants to the municipality after the last election (at constant terms); second, the change for the same period in the per capita total expenditures; and third, the change for the same period in the 11 Despite the fact that there could be some evidence that those selected variables could be endogenous ones leading to bias estimation problems, there is no more municipal information available to take this problem into account. So, we prefer to take in mind the bias generated by endogeneity rather than another one generated by wrong estimations. 12 We investigated if the change in provincial grants to each Municipality is influenced by the decisions of political parties at the provincial level. To this aim, we used the Wilcoxon test to investigate whether the distribution of the changes in provincial grants in the per capita public investments of the municipality. 10 11 People, it is supposed, consider provincial grants because the more the municipality obtains, ceteris paribus, the less taxes they will have to pay, or the more goods they will get for the same taxes. 12 They also consider, one can assume, total expenditures since the higher the expenditures, the higher the taxes to finance them. People supposedly observe public investment at the municipal level because it affects daily life: public lightening, traffic lights, roads, and urban infrastructure in general. This kind of expenditure represents a permanent improvement in individuals' welfare. As a control variable, we add the size of the population taking into account that the smaller the community, the more sensitive citizens will be to the performance of authorities in government and the more powerful individual votes will be (the power of votes is 1/N, where N is the population). 13 14 We also include two proxy variables for the changes in income per capita: the change in the consumption of home electricity per capita and the change in the number of cars per capita. Lack of data on the evolution of personal income led us to use these proxies. The results for the 1987 election show that there is no individual significance for any of the independent variables (investment is the most significant individual variable, at 20 %). In addition, there is not overall significance of the model. The signs are as expected for the grants (the less the grants, the higher the probability of change in political party), for the investment (the less the investment, the higher the probability of change in political party) and the population (the less the population, the higher the probability of change in political party -the less The values in parenthesis present the value of statistic z (* 5 % significant; ** 10 % significant; *** 20 % significant). The test of overall significance corresponds to statistic x 2 . The critical value at 5 % for regressions (4), (5) y (6) is 11,07 (model I.1.) y 12,59 (model I.2.). efficiency, the less the probability of change in the political party. The sign is as expected but not significant. The change in general economic conditions does not have a significant effect on municipal elections. Following Peltzman we would say that voters understand that their personal income (or proxies) is affected by national or provincial policies rather than municipal policies.
From the analysis of the three periods separately, it becomes evident that the model is increasingly significant as one moves in time, with overall significance for the 1995 election. The significance of individual variables follows a similar pattern. An interesting example is the variation in per capita capital expenditures. This is the only fiscal variable that is significant on its own in the third period (4 %). As it happens with the overall significance of the model, the tests show that this variable is increasingly useful. The variation in total expenditures and provincial grants, though not individually significant, have the expected signs and, as one moves in time, the coefficients tend towards individual relevance.
Some interesting results arise when we add, for each election, a dummy variable which distinguishes whether the winning party in the Municipality is the same (1) or different (0) from the Governor`s party. This variable is only significant in the 1987 election and when it is included, the total estimation improves. For this election, the positive sign shows that the probability of change is higher if the Governor's political party is challenging in the Municipalities. This result reveals that the 1987 municipal elections were deeply influenced by the results of the provincial election. The dummy variable is not significant in the other elections (Model I.2., Tables 6.1 and 6.2).
Several interpretations are possible. First, results suggest that after a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance of municipal authorities.
Our study suggests that citizens interpret bad fiscal performance as evidence that their political party is unqualified for the position and unseat it in the next election.
Only in 1987 were municipal electoral outcomes influenced by the provincial election. Second, the smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Third, citizens use information related with the years prior to the election. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past as a benchmark. Finally, it is the changes in the fiscal variables that affect votes. Our findings reveal that the electoral performance of one jurisdiction depends upon the jurisdiction's own fiscal policy; that voters seem to understand who (national, provincial or municipal governments) is responsible for what policy; that the possibility of "looking" is verified for the variables that are palpable for citizens (e.g. capital expenditures), with a permanent effect on their welfare. Those citizens would penalize the growth in total expenditures and would reward provincial grants and municipal efficiency. These results are congruent with Peltzman's. One additional conclusion is that the increase in municipal information, both from a citizen's municipality and the neighbouring municipalities (yardstick competition), may contribute to improve the performance of municipal governments. Finally, looking for new and appropriate political institutions like direct democracy may also benefit performance and happiness as several studies for other countries suggest (Pommerehne and Weck, 1996; Frey, 1997; Feld and Savioz, 1997) . 17 Results, though preliminary, seem to show that it is possible to trust in fiscal decentralization and the democratic mechanism.
The previous analysis was based on cross-section specifications where the observable units are the Municipalities in three different elections. Now, as an additional instrument, we use the panel data structure. The fundamental advantage of a panel data set over the cross-section is that it allows great flexibility in modeling differences in behaviour across Municipalities and/or over time. In this case, our main objective is to analyze the intertemporal evolution of the coefficients. To this aim, we suggest two models for the analysis of the panel data structure. Firstly, we used a model (Model II, Coefficients are multiplied by 1.000 (except those of the constant and the dummy).
The values in parenthesis present the value of statistic z (* 5 % significant; ** 10 % significant; *** 20 % significant). 
V. Conclusions
This paper has investigated, empirically, the voters' choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in the Province of Buenos Aires Three fiscal variables were selected for the analysis of the relationship between results in elections and fiscal performance: first, the change in the per capita provincial grants to the municipality after the last election; second, the change for the same period in the per capita total expenditures; and third, the change for the results show expected signs and individual significance of the variables. The Hausman test shows that the null hypothesis of fixed effects is rejected in both specifications (with and without the dummy variable). So, in this case, as we reject the hypothesis of the existence of fixed effects, the logit estimator is consistent and efficient while the Chamberlain estimator, though consistent, is inefficient. same period in the per capita public investments of the municipality. People, it is supposed, consider provincial grants because the more the municipality obtains, ceteris paribus, the less taxes they will have to pay, or the more goods they will get for the same taxes. They also consider, one can assume, total expenditures since the higher the expenditures, the higher the taxes to finance them. People supposedly observe public investment at the municipal level because it affects daily life: public lightening, traffic lights, roads, and urban infrastructure in general. As a control variable, we add the size of the population taking into account that the smaller the community, the more sensitive citizens will be to the performance of authorities in government and the more powerful individual votes will be (the power of votes is 1/N, where N is the population). We also include a variable representing the changes in general economic conditions (proxies of the changes in income per capita). We also add a dummy variable in order to analyze the relationship between the political party of the province and the political party of the municipalities.
We used the logit regression method where the dependent variable is a binary variable valued one if the political party changes in an election and zero otherwise.
First, results suggest that after a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance of municipal authorities. Our study suggests that citizens interpret bad fiscal performance as evidence that their political party is unqualified for the position and unseat it in the next election. Only in 1987 municipal electoral outcomes were influenced by provincial election. Second, the smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Third, citizens use information related with the years prior to the election. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past as a benchmark. Finally, it is the changes in the fiscal variables that affect votes. Our findings reveal that the electoral performance of one jurisdiction depends upon the jurisdiction's own fiscal policy. They also suggest that voters seem to understand who is responsible for what policy.
To conclude, preliminary results suggest that fiscal decentralization and the democratic mechanisms, together with the mobility of goods and factors, can make fiscal centralization less necessary than the models of political economy and several proposals for countries like Argentina suggest. If we add the impact of decentralization on happiness we have another interesting plus.
